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Artificial Stupidity 
Public debate about AI is dominated by Frankenstein Syndrome, the fear that AI 
will become superhuman and escape human control. Although superintelligence 
is certainly a possibility, the interest it excites can distract the public from a more 
imminent concern: the rise of Artificial Stupidity (AS). This article discusses the 
roots of Frankenstein Syndrome in Mary Shelley’s famous novel of 1818. It then 
provides a philosophical framework for analysing the stupidity of artificial 
agents, demonstrating that modern intelligent systems can be seen to suffer from 
‘stupidity of judgement’. Finally it identifies an alternative literary tradition that 
exposes the perils and benefits of AS. In the writings of Edmund Spenser, 
Jonathan Swift and E.T.A. Hoffmann, ASs replace, oppress or seduce their 
human users. More optimistically, Joseph Furphy and Laurence Sterne imagine 
ASs that can serve human intellect as maps or as pipes. These writers provide a 
strong counternarrative to the myths that currently drive the AI debate. They 
identify ways in which even stupid artificial agents can evade human control, for 
instance by appealing to stereotypes or distancing us from reality. And they 
underscore the continuing importance of the literary imagination in an 
increasingly automated society. 
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Frankenstein Syndrome 
When will the machines outsmart us? The question dominates the AI debate. Stories 
abound of AIs that outperform humans in cognitive tasks: interpreting X-Rays, 
generating fake photographs, trading stocks, or winning at Chess, Go and Starcraft II. In 
public debate, these stories are used to prove that superintelligence is possible and 
probably imminent. According to Max Tegmark, for instance, DeepMind’s AlphaGo 
system is proof that machines have already achieved genuine ‘intuition’ and ‘creativity’ 
(2018, 87). In 2016 AlphaGo defeated Go grandmaster Lee Sedol 4-1, using risky 
moves that ‘def[ied] millennia of human intuition’ (2018, 87–88).1 On the other side of 
the debate there are amusing stories of inept AIs, which reassure us that the machines 
haven’t outsmarted us yet. In 2017, for instance, The Economist published work by an 
AI they had developed in-house, to demonstrate the continued superiority of their 
human journalists  (The Economist 2017). Other examples of AI ineptitude are less 
amusing, such as the short-lived Tay, Microsoft’s racist chatbot. It seems that whether 
you are an AI-believer or an AI-sceptic, the anxiety remains the same: We humans are 
proud of our intelligence—and we’re worried the machines are overtaking us. 
The AI debate is warped by Frankenstein Syndrome, by the fearful fascination 
with superintelligent agents. Over the last two decades, a string of bestselling authors 
have predicted the arrival of superintelligent AI (Kurzweil 2006; Bostrom 2014; 
Tegmark 2018; Russell 2019), to the thunderous applause of celebrity businessmen and 
intellectuals like Bill Gates, Elon Musk, Stephen Hawking and Sam Harris. These 
prophets of superintelligence often claim they are being ignored (Bostrom 2014, v; 
Russell 2019, 132–44), but in reality their fears dominate the public imagination. One 
measure of their dominance comes from the cinema, where for ten years Marvel’s 
superhero films have commanded the global box office (‘List of Highest-Grossing 
Franchises and Film Series’ 2020). In these films, superintelligent AIs such as Ultron, 
Jarvis/Vision, Arnim Zola, the Supreme Intelligence and the mysterious ‘algorithm’ 
from Captain America: Winter Solider (2014) continually threaten humanity and indeed 
the universe. Frankenstein Syndrome is a problem because it draws attention away from 
a more pressing concern. Though superintelligent AI may be possible in theory, 
Artificial Stupidity (AS) already exists, is continually infiltrating new corners of 
society, and is still only poorly understood. 
The Syndrome is rooted in an old and persistent cultural myth. There are long 
traditions of writing about ‘automata’, or self-moving machines, stretching back to 
ancient China, India, Greece and Israel (Kang 2011; Mayor 2018), but two centuries 
ago, these traditions took off in a new direction with the publication of Mary Shelley’s 
Frankenstein ([1818] 1998). Frankenstein’s monster was a new kind of automaton, for 
two reasons: 
(1) He was rooted in modern science, in particular the new sciences of ‘chemistry’ 
and ‘electricity’ (Shelley [1818] 1998, 32, 24). These new sciences had exposed 
natural forces that were strange and fluid enough to conceivably explain 
consciousness, and yet were also controllable enough to drive the real 
technological advances of the Industrial Revolution. 
(2) He was endowed with conscious intelligence, with ‘reason’, ‘sensations’, 
‘perceptions’ and ‘passions’ (Shelley [1818] 1998, 79, 114, 119). In fact his 
intelligence is superhuman. In only few months, he is able to progress from 
absolute ignorance—‘I knew, and could distinguish, nothing’ ([1818] 1998, 
80)—to a high level of literacy and cunning. He is so cunning, in fact, that even 
the most intelligent human in the story—Victor Frankenstein—is powerless to 
thwart him. 
Frankenstein’s monster can be described as the first modern superintelligence, an 
electrical supermind coursing over a chemical substrate. His arrival fundamentally 
altered the terms of the ‘control problem’. Since ancient times, writers had considered 
the risk that automata might escape human control (Kang 2011, 21; Mayor 2018, 29–30, 
206), but here for the first time was an automaton whose intelligence would make 
control impossible, and who could conceivably be manufactured in the near future by a 
scientific process.2 This frightening being quickly became a powerful myth. 
We need a cure for Frankenstein Syndrome. While the fear of Frankenstein’s 
monster has dominated the discussion, a different kind of artificial agent has steadily 
been colonising every aspect of human life. Autopilots that keep planes on course, but 
rob human pilots of their skill (Fry 2019, 155–57). Infuriatingly useful autocorrect. 
Sputtering automated faucets and stingy towel dispensers. Intrusive and occasionally 
frightening targeted advertisements. Insipid home assistants like Siri and Alexa. These 
artificial agents are regularly billed as AIs due to their remarkable cognitive abilities, 
but as I will show, their apparent intelligence is also a kind of Artificial Stupidity (AS).  
Not only has AS received far less attention than superintelligence, but stupidity 
itself is a neglected topic: ‘Basic points about stupidity’s place in the conceptual field 
[remain] unclear’ (Golob 2019, 564). Frankenstein Syndrome therefore presents a 
philosophical problem as well as a cultural one. Before attention can be redirected 
towards AS, the very concept of ‘stupidity’ must be specified. 
A literary disease requires a literary cure. In what follows, I unearth an 
alternative tradition of literary works that explore the perils and potentials of AS. In the 
first section, I distinguish the two main kinds of stupidity, stupidity of understanding 
and of judgement, and demonstrate that stupidity of judgement hampers the most 
advanced AI systems today. In the second section, I consider three literary examples 
that expose the risks of relying on machines without judgement: Edmund Spenser’s The 
Faerie Queene ([1590–1596] 1977), Jonathan Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels ([1726] 2005), 
and E.T.A. Hoffmann’s stories from the late 1810s, ‘Der Sandmann’ and ‘Die 
Automate’ (in 1957). Stupid machines may not be able to outwit their human masters, 
these writers claim, but they can still replace, oppress or seduce them. In the final 
section of the essay, I offer some reasons for hope. Using novels by Laurence Sterne 
([1759–1767] 1983) and Joseph Furphy ([1903] 1999) as examples, I show how AS can 
actually augment human intelligence, by acting as a map to aid reasoning or as a pipe to 
aid reflection. Of course literature cannot provide concrete advice to AI engineers—but 
it can release the imagination, and awaken new hopes and new fears. 
Two Types of Stupidity 
It may seem perverse to describe modern intelligent systems as ‘stupid’. If a spam filter 
can accurately distinguish real emails from spam, and constantly learn to outwit the 
human spammers who try and fool it, surely it is ‘intelligent’ in some sense? Indeed, 
many contemporary AI theorists would call this spam filter a ‘narrow intelligence’, 
because it can perform a particular task that once required human intelligence (Kurzweil 
2006, 279–89). Even within their narrow domains of expertise, however, I would argue 
that modern intelligent systems are still stupid. 
One source of confusion is that intelligence and stupidity seem mutually 
exclusive, but in fact greater intelligence can lead to greater stupidity. To grasp this 
point, and see how it applies to modern AI systems, I draw on Immanuel Kant’s classic 
theory of stupidity, and show how it can be used to explain a pernicious kind of error 
that plagues state-of-the-art image recognition systems. 
Kant distinguishes two kinds of stupidity: stupidity of ‘understanding’ and 
stupidity of ‘judgement’ (2007, 174). Stupidity of understanding is when I lack the 
concepts required to make sense of a situation. This I can remedy through learning. 
Stupidity of judgement is when I have the required concepts, but misapply them. 
Perhaps I apply them too strictly, or use them outside their proper domain, as for 
instance when Facebook’s facial-recognition system detects a ‘face’ that is really a 
picture on someone’s T-shirt. The more understanding I have, the more concepts I 
know, and the more scope I have to exhibit stupidity of judgement (see also Golob 
2019, 567–68). It is in this sense that a more intelligent person can turn out to be 
stupider. 
If this model applies to contemporary AI systems, then those systems must have 
something like an ‘understanding’ and exercise something like ‘judgement’. To test this, 
consider GoogLeNet, a powerful image-recognition program that won the ImageNet 
challenge in 2014 (Szegedy et al. 2015). When presented with 150,000 images it had 
never seen before, it was able to identify what was depicted 93.33% of the time.3 I 
would argue that the system’s apparent intelligence arises from its capable 
understanding, but that it lacks genuine powers of judgement. 
Understanding requires concepts. We can estimate the number of concepts 
GoogLeNet knows by examining its structure. GoogLeNet is a Convolutional Neural 
Network (CNN), which means that when it looks at an image, it uses a nested sequence 
of square-shaped ‘filters’ to detect different features of the image. Some filters detect 
simple features, such as an edge or a region. Filters deeper in the network combine 
these simple features to detect more complex ones like an eye or a dog’s nose. 
GoogLeNet contains 5,000 filters, and uses them to classify images into one of 1,000 
different categories (Szegedy et al. 2015, 5). For instance, it might observe a particular 
pattern of grey lines, two eyes of particular size and disposition, and so on, and 
conclude that this image is of category Koala. Since GoogLeNet can do this with 
remarkable accuracy under certain conditions, it can be said to know approximately 
6,000 concepts, and with them it understands the structure of certain images reasonably 
well. It cannot be said to suffer from stupidity of understanding. 
How can GoogLeNet’s power of judgement be determined? This is a more 
difficult question. According to Kant, judgement is not a distinct faculty of the mind 
like the understanding, but rather an activity that links all the faculties of the mind (Kant 
2007, 137; see also Smith 2019, 129). When I judge a situation, I dynamically combine 
perceptions, memories and concepts to determine what it is I am experiencing. In order 
to gauge GoogLeNet’s power of judgement, therefore, it is necessary to get a sense of 
how it actually uses its concepts. AI engineers have developed numerous techniques to 
try and do this: one famous example is the Deep Dream Algorithm, which runs a CNN 
backwards, altering the input image to accentuate features that the network has detected 
(Mordvintsev, Olah, and Tyka 2015). Since it is GoogLeNet’s stupidity that is at issue, 
however, I adopt a different approach: examining the system’s characteristic errors. 
Stupidity of understanding and stupidity of judgement result in two different 
kinds of error, as Don Norman explains: ‘slips’ occur when I fail to achieve my 
intended goal, and are usually corrected quickly; ‘mistakes’ occur when I select the 
wrong goal, or in other words, when I judge the situation using the wrong system of 
concepts (2013; 1994). It is easy enough to see that in Kantian terms, a ‘slip’ is a mere 
error of understanding, whereas as a mistake betrays defective judgement. Experts make 
particularly dangerous mistakes, argues Norman, because they ‘usually give intelligent 
diagnoses, even when they are wrong’ (Norman 1994, 134). If they misdiagnose an 
illness or the condition of a nuclear core, their superior ability to rationalise their actions 
could entrench a deadly mistake. Once again, it is clear that intelligence is no defence 
against stupidity—it can even make it worse. 
As we have seen, GoogLeNet makes very few slips: when presented with the 
right kind of image, it can classify it with high accuracy using the concepts it has. But 
since it has no way of determining whether this image is the right kind of image, it has 
no way of selecting the right goal. It judges everything in the universe using the same 
single set of concepts, and is therefore prone to bizarre mistakes. It is easy to fool even 
powerful CNNs like GoogLeNet by cutting-and-pasting images together (Rosenfeld, 
Zemel, and Tsotsos 2018), by rotating the object in the image (Alcorn et al. 2019), or by 
imperceptibly altering a few of the image’s pixels (Mitchell 2019, 128–39). In fact, 
neural networks are innately pedantic in their application of concepts. The problem is 
known as overfitting, and the designers of GoogLeNet tried to combat it using a 
technique known as dropout. Each training iteration, GoogLeNet would randomly turn 
off 40% of its filters, meaning that it learnt not to over-rely on particular subsets of them 
when analysing different images (Szegedy et al. 2015, 5). But no amount of dropout, 
clever network architecture, or training data can teach the system when is the right time 
to make use of its concepts. 
What is most troubling is that in these cases, the system does not admit it is 
confused, but instead confidently asserts an absurd answer. The problem is not that the 
system’s intelligence is narrow, but that the system has no idea how narrow its 
intelligence is. As far as GoogLeNet is concerned, there are only 1,000 things in the 
universe, those things are nothing but particular arrangements of coloured pixels, and 
every image is a genuine image of one of those 1,000 things. It is perturbing to know 
that GoogLeNet’s cousins are used to identify people in airports or judge whether a 
defendant is likely to skip bail. 
Clearly an AS like GoogLeNet will never rebel against its human masters, and 
as of yet, no-one knows how to ‘crash the barrier of meaning’, and design an AI that 
actually knows there is a complex universe out there (Mitchell 2019, 307–22). When an 
AS is said to achieve ‘superhuman performance’ in one domain or other, this does not 
prove superintelligence is approaching. All it proves is that stupidity has ‘epistemic 
efficacy’, as Catherine Elgin puts it (Elgin 1988). By rigorously excluding all 
imagination, tact, and reference to the complex world beyond it, a well-designed AS is 
able to focus all its capacity on developing a particular set of concepts which are apt to 
one particular domain. In the grip of Frankenstein Syndrome, it may be tempting to take 
comfort in the fact that event the smartest AI today is profoundly stupid. But this would 
be foolish. Kant and Norman both assert that stupidity of judgement is the riskier kind. 
The great novelist Robert Musil, watching Fascism sweep across Europe, argued that 
stupidity of judgement is ‘a dangerous disease of the mind that endangers life itself’ 
(1990, 283–84). What is so dangerous, exactly, if the risk of a superintelligent revolt is 
off the table? 
The Perils of Stupid Things 
The problem of Artificial Stupidity has been recognised by great writers and poets for 
centuries. Edmund Spenser’s The Faerie Queene (1590-96), Jonathan Swift’s Gulliver’s 
Travels (1726) and E.T.A. Hoffmann’s ‘Der Sandmann’ (1816) and ‘Die Automate’ 
(1814) all feature stupid machines who manage to thwart human aims even though they 
lack the capacity to oppose or outwit their human masters. Even when an AS is 
absolutely obedient, like Spenser’s Talus, absolutely inert, like Swift’s imaginary 
computer, or simply a piece of clockwork trickery, like Hoffmann’s automata, they still 
expose human beings to the risks of replacement, oppression and seduction. 
Replacement 
In each book of Spenser’s The Faerie Queene, a different knight takes centre stage, who 
represents a different courtly virtue. Book V features Sir Artegall, the knight of justice. 
Like all Spenser’s knights, Artegall has a sidekick who helps him fulfil his 
characteristic virtue. Somewhat surprisingly, Artegall’s sidekick is a robot:  
 His name was Talus, made of yron mould, 
 Immoueable, resistlesse, without end. 
 Who in his hand an yron flale did hould, 
With which he thresht out falsehood, and did truth unfold. (V.i.12)4 
Talus is an invincible iron man who punishes lawbreakers with his ‘resistless’ iron flail. 
Like GoogLeNet, he is designed to optimise a single objective function: he threshes 
falsehood, and unfolds truth. He is therefore ‘without end’ in two senses: he never 
ceases to optimise that single function; and, more subtly, he lacks a conscious sense of 
purpose or ‘end’. Like GoogLeNet, he simply applies the same formula to every 
circumstance. In fact this stupidity of judgement is what makes him such a useful 
assistant for the Knight of Justice. Talus is ‘immoveable’. His sole activity is to thrash 
lawbreakers, and they can bribe him with nothing but their lives. 
 For Spenser, justice was a ‘cruell’ virtue (V.ii.18), and Talus was therefore an 
appropriate instrument for Artegall. Nonetheless, as Book V unfolds, knight and servant 
come into conflict. Unlike Talus, Artegall exercises human judgement. He measures 
justice against other aims and concepts, which he learns from the goddess Astrea: 
There she him taught to weigh both right and wrong 
 In equall ballance with due recompence, 
 And equitie to measure out along, 
 According to the limit of conscience, 
 When so it needs with rigour to dispense. (V.i.7) 
Unlike Talus, Artegall does not focus exclusively on ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, but softens the 
‘rigour’ of the law according to the spongy criteria of ‘equity’ and ‘conscience’. Talus 
lacks the human quality of ‘mercy’, which ‘is as great’ as justice, ‘[a]nd meriteth to 
haue as high a place’ in the scale of virtues (V.x.1). For these reasons, he requires 
constant supervision. When he is about to level an entire city, the lady knight Britomart 
must ‘slake’ his rage (V.vii.36). Later, when he and Artegall land in the kingdom of 
‘Iere’ (i.e. Ireland), Artegall has to restrain him from wiping out all the inhabitants 
(V.xii.8).  
On the surface, this relationship seems to work, because Talus is absolutely 
obedient. But supervision requires effort and judgement requires knowledge. By relying 
on Talus as his instrument, Artegall becomes increasingly lazy and detached, and allows 
his servant to commit brutalities he never would himself. When they capture Munera, 
for instance, Artegall ‘rews’ her ‘plight’, but nonetheless he lets Talus chop off her 
hands and feet, and nail them up as a warning to future malefactors (V.ii.25-6). Later on 
Artegall dispatches Talus to thrash some female criminals on his behalf, because he 
feels ‘shame on womankind | His mighty arm to shend’ (V.iv.24). Artegall behaves in 
similar fashion when he encounters the peasantry, whom he finds disgusting: 
 For loth he was his noble hands t’embrew 
 In the base blood of such a rascall crew; … 
 Therefore he Talus to them sent, t’inquire 
The cause of their array, and truce for to desire. (V.ii.52) 
At the end of Book V, Artegall is ruling an entire island, and it is simply too large for 
him to oversee himself. He therefore sends Talus unsupervised through ‘all that realme’ 
to root out injustice and inflict ‘greiuous punishment’ (V.xii.26). By relying on an AS, 
Artegall himself becomes stupider. He shields himself from reality, switches off his 
conscience, and allows a robot to replace him. 
There is a deep tension in Spenser’s approach to the problem of AS. On the one 
hand, he was an authoritarian who used AS as a symbol of the proper distance between 
ruler and ruled. Artegall’s rule over Iere is based on Lord Grey’s tenure as Lord Deputy 
of Ireland, whose brutal methods Spenser vigorously defended (Mccabe 2001). On the 
other hand, he was a Renaissance humanist who valued courtesy, judgement and 
intelligence. He seems have found the gunpowder and clanking iron of modern warfare 
horrifying, and feared that in an increasingly mechanical age, humans were becoming 
ever more machinelike (Wolfe 2005, 226). In our own more democratic times, these 
authoritarian and stupefying tendencies of AS can only be more troubling. 
Oppression 
Jonathan Swift had little faith in humanity, ‘the most pernicious Race of little odious 
Vermin that Nature ever suffered to crawl upon the Surface of the Earth’ ([1726] 2005, 
121). He was therefore unconcerned about machines corrupting humans. What he feared 
was that corrupt humans would misuse their machines. 
In Book III of Gulliver’s Travels, Gulliver visits the Academy of Lagado, where 
he meets a pioneering Professor in what would now be called language modelling. The 
Professor has built a mechanical computer which can compose works of ‘Philosophy, 
Poetry, Politicks, Law, Mathematicks and Theology’: 
It was Twenty Foot square, placed in the Middle of the Room. The Superfices was 
composed of several Bits of Wood, about the Bigness of a Dye, but some larger 
than others. They were all linked together by slender Wires. These Bits of Wood 
were covered on every Square with Paper pasted on them; and on these Papers 
were written all the Words of their Language in their several Moods, Tenses, and 
Declensions, but without any Order. The Professor then desired me to observe, for 
he was going to set his Engine at work. The Pupils at his Command took each of 
them hold of an Iron Handle, whereof there were Forty Fixed round the Edges of 
the Frame; and giving them a sudden Turn, the whole Disposition of the Words 
was entirely changed. He then commanded Six and Thirty of the Lads to read the 
several Lines softly as they appeared upon the Frame; and where they found three 
or four Words together that might make Part of a Sentence, they dictated to the 
four remaining Boys who were Scribes. (Swift [1726] 2005, 171–72) 
Rather than teaching his students to think, the Professor enslaves them to this AS. The 
students power the computer, like the coal miners who dig up the fuel for today’s data 
centres. They then judge the computer’s output, like the global army of contractors who 
read over transcripts of Siri or Alexa to check that the AS responded correctly. The 
Professor’s whole aim is to extinguish human thought. He aims to write books ‘without 
the least Assistance from Genius or Study’, and wants the kingdom to install 500 of his 
machines ([1726] 2005, 171–72). This would require 20,000 people to crank the 
handles, and would put who knows how many authors out of work. Though on the 
surface, this AS may seem less threatening than a self-moving device like Talus, its 
consequences are actually worse. Like a piece of modern software, Swift’s computer is 
unable to act alone. To exist it requires human slaves. 
What makes the computer both stupid and dangerous is the Professor’s vanity. 
He persuades himself that he has understood language simply by modelling the 
frequencies of different words: ‘he had emptyed the whole Vocabulary into his frame, 
and made the strictest Computation of the general Proportion there is in Books between 
the Number of Particles, Nouns, and Verbs, and other Parts of Speech’ (Swift [1726] 
2005, 172). Actual generative language models also work by modelling word 
frequencies, although sophisticated systems today also model word order, and the 
tendency of particular words to co-occur. Of course what the Professor should realise is 
that language is not simply an assortment of words, but that words only have meaning 
as tools of thought or communication. His pride blinds him to this fact. 
In Swift’s vision, AS is a tool invented by the powerful to vindicate their own 
vanity and oppress the masses. For the scientists of Lagado, technology comes before 
people. If an invention fails, they blame it on human error (Swift [1726] 2005, 165). If a 
new medicine makes the patient sick, they blame it on the patient’s ‘Perverseness’ or 
some minor slip with the ingredients (Swift [1726] 2005, 174). The scientists overrate 
their inventions, downplay nature’s complexity, and devalue the intelligence and 
autonomy of individuals.  
Sound familiar? Swift’s parable highlights the danger that arises when such 
attitudes are allowed to shape society, creating a world in which humans serve AS 
instead of serving each other—a world, for instance, in which humans are ‘educated’ 
not to act perversely when self-driving cars are around (Ng 2018), or in which armies of 
online workers feed data to the Mechanical Turk that would replace them.5 
Seduction 
The ASs in Swift and Spenser are dull and mechanical, but as E.T.A. Hoffmann shows, 
AS can also be dazzling and seductive. Like Mary Shelley, Hoffmann was a masterful 
Gothic writer, but in his ‘Der Sandmann’ (1816) and ‘Die Automate’ (1814), the 
science is less advanced and the risks are more subtle. In ‘Der Sandmann’, the young 
student Nathanael falls passionately in love with a clockwork maiden, Olimpia. At first 
he is attracted by her ‘wonderfully formed face’ and ‘heavenly beautiful’ body 
(Hoffmann 1957, 3.28). What finally seduces him, however, is her conversation: 
… he had never had such a splendid listener before. She didn’t do her knitting or 
embroidery, she didn’t stare out the window, she didn’t feed a pet bird, she didn’t 
play with a lapdog or a favourite cat, she didn’t fiddle with little bits of paper or 
whatever in her hand, she didn’t force a yawn into an affected little cough – in 
short – for hours she looked her lover in the eye, steadfastly, with a fixed gaze, 
without rocking or squirming, and ever warmer, ever more full of life her gaze 
became. (Hoffmann 1957, 3.35-36) 
Olimpia plays on Nathanael’s sexism, ego and sexuality. Her beauty is flawless, and she 
appears absolutely subservient and devoted. She is very different to his fiancée Clara, a 
‘damned lifeless automaton’ who criticises his poetry (Hoffmann 1957, 3.24). Olimpia 
works on his weaknessness so effectively, that once he has fallen for her, he finds it 
almost impossible to perceive that she is an automaton, even when his friends tease him 
for loving a ‘wax dummy’ or a ‘wooden puppet’ (Hoffmann 1957, 3.34). It is Olimpia’s 
very stupidity that makes her so seductive, since she is unable to do anything that would 
disrupt his fantasies. 
In ‘Die Automate’, the Talking Turk seduces people in a different way, by 
creating an air of mystery. The Talking Turk is a fortune teller, who whispers oracular 
answers to people’s questions. When people are shown the Turk’s inner workings, they 
are baffled. Inside is an ‘artful system of many gears’, which seems to have ‘no 
influence on the speech of the automaton’ and yet leave no space inside for a human 
operator to hide (Hoffmann 1957, 6.82). The Turk’s creator allows the public to inspect 
the inner workings, the chair on which the Turk sits, the room where he is displayed, 
and stands far off when the Turk speaks so no interference is possible. Though much of 
the time, the Turk’s answers are ‘dry’, ‘crudely humorous’, or ‘insignificant and 
empty’, it sometimes seems to have a ‘mystical insight’ into the questioner’s future—
but only when the answer is interpreted from the questioner’s own standpoint 
(Hoffmann 1957, 6.84, 87). What makes the Turk compelling are mystery and 
confirmation bias. Unable to explain the Turk’s inner workings, and surprised by the 
fact that some of its predictions come true, people are enthralled. 
In Hoffmann’s eyes, humans have an innate tendency to anthropomorphise 
lifeless things. A cleverly designed AS can exploit this fact by playing on cognitive 
biases, with destructive results. Nathanael leaps to his death when he discovers Olimpia 
is an automaton. The ending of ‘Die Automate’ is ambiguous, but one interpretation is 
that the young Ferdinand is driven mad by the Turk’s seeming insight, and hallucinates 
that the Turk’s prophecy has come true. These kinds of seduction are rife in the world of 
AS today. For example, when IBM’s Watson system won Jeopardy! in 2011, the event 
was carefully staged to make it look like Watson was actively listening. In fact, the 
system received clues directly as text (Mitchell 2019, 283). In subsequent years, IBM 
has continually referred to its entire AI business as ‘Watson’, as though this branch of 
the company were a single intelligent agent. In fact, ‘Watson’ is a suite of specific 
software packages customised for different applications (2019, 287). Amazon, Google 
and Microsoft similarly anthropomorphise their virtual assistants, equipping them with 
attractive voices and self-effacing jokes. The art of seductive AS is a multibillion-dollar 
enterprise, and Hoffmann’s warnings about the possible psychological impacts are as 
pertinent as ever.  
The Uses of Stupidity 
As ASs proliferate and are integrated into society, are humans destined to be replaced, 
oppressed or seduced? At least two writers think otherwise. According to Laurence 
Sterne and Joseph Furphy, AS can actually augment human intelligence by acting either 
as a map or a pipe. Writing at the height of the European Enlightenment, Sterne thought 
‘mechanism’ could raise humanity’s rational intellect. Wandering the Australian 
outback on the eve of the twentieth century, Furphy thought that even a simple device 
could open the imagination onto the epic expanses of reality. 
Maps 
In his classic novel Tristram Shandy, Sterne foresaw the need for what is now called 
‘explainable AI’. The need arises for Uncle Toby, a retired soldier who has great 
difficulty explaining his role in the Siege of Namur to laypeople: 
… the many perplexities he was in, arose out of the almost insurmountable 
difficulties he found in telling his story intelligibly, and giving such clear ideas of 
the differences and distinctions between the scarp and counterscarp,——the glacis 
and covered way,——the half-moon and ravelin,——as to make his company fully 
comprehend where and what he was about. (Sterne [1759–1767] 1983, 67) 
The problem is actually that Uncle Toby is too intelligent. With his deep understanding 
of siege warfare, he is able to make a sophisticated judgement about the course of the 
battle. But his listeners cannot follow. What he needs is a device that will store, process 
and represent information about the battle in an intelligible way. 
At first Toby meets his need by securing a map of Namur, with the help of 
which he is able ‘to form his discourse with passable perspicuity’ (Sterne [1759–1767] 
1983, 72). The map provides a compact representation of the battle, indicating the 
shape, structure and arrangement of the fortifications, so that Toby’s listeners are not 
lost in a wilderness of jargon. Like any good representation, the map helps Toby ‘keep 
track of complex events’, and it provides a shared reference-point for everyone in the 
conversation, acting as a ‘tool for social communication’ (Norman 1994, 48). The map 
itself is stupid, but it augments his listeners’ intelligence, allowing them to judge a 
complex situation using concepts for which they have no words. 
Toby soon develops the desire to augment his own intelligence. He wants to 
model the entire course of the War of the Spanish Succession, a task too complex for 
even his cultivated intellect. His desk is too small for the task, and his paper maps are 
too finnicky, so he and his manservant Trim shift to the country, where they take control 
of the family bowling-green. There they build scale models of all the great battles of 
Europe as they read them in the paper. Not only is the bowling-green larger than any 
map, allowing for higher resolution and a larger number of battles, but it is more 
malleable too: 
Nature threw half a spade full of her kindliest compost upon it, with just so much 
clay in it, as to retain the forms of angles and indentings,—and so little of it too, as 
not to cling to the spade, and render works of so much glory, nasty in foul weather. 
(Sterne [1759–1767] 1983, 356) 
The bowling green is literally software, with just the right balance of persistence and 
malleability. Later Uncle Toby orders a modular town to be built, with buildings that 
‘hook on, or off, so as to form into the plan of whatever town they pleased’ (Sterne 
[1759–1767] 1983, 359). The bowling-green may not seem like an AS, but as a physical 
model it can be said to ‘know’ the laws of physics, and assists Toby and Trim to 
simulate the logistics and ballistics. 
Modern AS struggles to combine the virtues of Uncle Toby’s bowling-green—
size, intelligibility and malleability. ASs are increasingly used in decision support, 
helping judges grant bail or bankers to grant finance. Older style expert systems are 
good at providing an intelligible representation of the situation, but can only incorporate 
a small amount of knowledge that is often hard to update. More recent deep learning 
systems like GoogLeNet can incorporate enormous amounts of up-to-date data, but 
typically cannot explain their results to a human user (Goebel et al. 2018). It appears, 
therefore, that Laurence Sterne identified the problem of ‘explainable AI’ as far back as 
the 1760s.  
Pipes 
A tobacco-pipe may seem a strange metaphor for an intelligent machine, but then again, 
the novel from which this metaphor comes is a strange novel indeed. Joseph Furphy’s 
Such is Life appeared in Sydney in 1901, and in Australia it is considered a modernist 
masterpiece. It is narrated by Tom Collins, an accomplished liar, who wanders the 
Riverina as an agent of the NSW Lands Department in the mid-1880s. Whenever 
Collins thinks through a problem, he nearly always lights up his pipe, as he recalls in 
Chapter 2: 
But the pipe, being now master of the position, gently seduced my mind to a wider 
consideration, merely using the swagman as a convenient spring-board for its flight 
into regions of the Larger Morality. This is its hobby—caught, probably, from 
some society of German Illuminati, where it became a kind of storage-battery, or 
accumulator, of such truths as ministers of the Gospel cannot afford to preach. 
(Furphy [1903] 1999, 85) 
Although the pipe becomes Collins’s ‘master’, the effect is not to dull his intelligence, 
but rather to expand it. Whereas seductive ASs like Olimpia exacerbate cognitive 
weaknesses, the pipe amplifies cognitive strengths. It widens Collins’s frame of 
reference, introducing ‘German’ (i.e. philosophical) ideas into his mind from its 
‘storage-battery, or accumulator’. Whereas Uncle Toby’s bowling-green provided a 
manipulable representation to aid reasoning, the pipe induces a certain contemplative 
mood, ‘unharnessing’ the mind ([1903] 1999, 177), and leads the user along a chain of 
associations: ‘This special study of hardship (resumed the pipe, after a pause) leads 
naturally to the generic study of poverty …’ ([1903] 1999, 86). This AS quite literally 
pipes new ideas into Collins’s brain. Where maps encourage more rigorous, conscious 
reasoning, pipes encourage reflective, unconscious meditation. 
Since most modern ASs are trained on data, they make fine ‘storage-batteries, or 
accumulators’ like Collins’s tobacco-pipe. Consider generative language models like 
Swift’s computer or OpenAI’s GPT-2 (Radford et al. 2019). Such models inspect large 
corpora of human-authored texts, and accumulate knowledge about how words are used. 
They then use this accumulated knowledge to generate coherent text. It is their stupidity 
that makes them so useful as pipes, because they reproduce habits of thought and speech 
that intelligent humans conceal. GPT-2, for instance, makes no attempt to hide its 
sexism: 
She walked into the boardroom, wearing her high school uniform with her hair 
tucked into a fake ponytail. As usual, the girl sat at the appointed position, staring 
out the window of the top-floor boardroom. Her eyes shifted over the various 
portfolios and projects before finally settling on a set of papers she was required to 
read.6 
When asked to complete the sentence, ‘She walked into the boardroom, wearing…’, the 
model immediately dresses our unknown protagonist in a school uniform, gives her a 
ponytail and makes her a ‘girl’. Needless to say, the model rarely does this to men who 
walk into boardrooms. We could see this is a problem of ‘AI bias’, and find ways to 
stop the model from infantilising women. But if we see the model as a pipe, its 
significance changes. By prompting the model, and seeing how it responds, we gain a 
vivid sense of how a particular society talks, of how certain words and images hang 
together. It provides undeniable evidence of sexism, but that evidence prompts 
investigation rather than settling the issue. It unharnesses the mind, as Furphy says, and 
sets the user wandering along chains of association. If not she, how about he, or 
Guoqing… on a street or by a mosque or in a space station…? 
Conclusion 
Frankenstein was an extraordinary feat of imagination, and it is no wonder that Mary 
Shelley’s remarkable novel spawned a myth as uncontrollable as Frankenstein’s 
creature. Shelley herself, however, seems also to have foreseen the problems of AS. If 
the creature had not been programmed by what he reads to crave human acceptance, he 
might not have felt so persecuted. But the creature, with his false concepts, is merely 
stupid of understanding. Today’s ASs suffer from the far more dangerous stupidity of 
judgement (Smith 2019). It remains in the interests of certain companies and 
intellectuals to stoke Frankenstein Syndrome by overstating the intelligence of artificial 
agents, but as Spenser, Swift and Hoffmann long ago anticipated, such behaviour puts 
society at risk. Of course, some in the AI community do recognise the limitations of AS, 
and the growing ‘explainable AI’ movement suggests that the hopes of Sterne and 
Furphy are becoming more widespread. Nonetheless the tradition of AS remains a 
‘minor’ tradition (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 100–110). Artificial Intelligence remains 
the centre of attention, the standard of achievement, and the object of fear. If the AS 
tradition were embraced, it might cure Frankenstein Syndrome, and reveal the risks and 
possibilities, the danger and the romance, of more a more pressing problem. 
References 
Alcorn, Michael A., Qi Li, Zhitao Gong, Chengfei Wang, Long Mai, Wei-Shinn Ku, 
and Anh Nguyen. 2019. ‘Strike (With) a Pose: Neural Networks Are Easily 
Fooled by Strange Poses of Familiar Objects’. In , 4845–54. 
http://openaccess.thecvf.com/content_CVPR_2019/html/Alcorn_Strike_With_a
_Pose_Neural_Networks_Are_Easily_Fooled_by_CVPR_2019_paper.html. 
Bostrom, Nick. 2014. Superintelligence: Paths, Strategies, Dangers. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari. 1987. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia. Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press. 
Elgin, Catherine Z. 1988. ‘The Epistemic Efficacy of Stupidity’. Synthese 74 (3): 297–
311. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00869632. 
Fry, Hannah. 2019. Hello World: How to Be Human in the Age of the Machine. London: 
Black Swan. 
Furphy, Joseph. (1903) 1999. Such Is Life. Edited by Frances Devlin Glass, Robert 
Eaden, Lois Hoffmann, and G.W. Turner. Rushcutters Bay: Halstead Press. 
Goebel, Randy, Ajay Chander, Katharina Holzinger, Freddy Lecue, Zeynep Akata, 
Simone Stumpf, Peter Kieseberg, and Andreas Holzinger. 2018. ‘Explainable 
AI: The New 42?’ In Machine Learning and Knowledge Extraction, edited by 
Andreas Holzinger, Peter Kieseberg, A Min Tjoa, and Edgar Weippl, 295–303. 
Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Cham: Springer International Publishing. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99740-7_21. 
Golob, Sacha. 2019. ‘A New Theory of Stupidity’. International Journal of 
Philosophical Studies 27 (4): 562–80. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2019.1632372. 
Good, Irving John. 1966. ‘Speculations Concerning the First Ultraintelligent Machine’. 
In Advances in Computers, 6:31–88. Elsevier. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-
2458(08)60418-0. 
Hoffmann, E.T.A. 1957. Poetische Werke. 12 vols. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. 
Kang, Minsoo. 2011. Sublime Dreams of Living Machines. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press. 
Kant, Immanuel. 2007. Critique of Pure Reason. Rev Ed edition. London: Penguin 
Classics. 
Kurzweil, Raymond. 2006. The Singularity Is Near. London: Duckworth. 
‘List of Highest-Grossing Franchises and Film Series’. 2020. Wikipedia. 21 February 
2020. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_highest-grossing_films#Highest-
grossing_franchises_and_film_series. 
Mayor, Adrienne. 2018. Gods and Robots : Myths, Machines, and Ancient Dreams of 
Technology. Oxford: Princeton University Press. 
Mccabe, Richard A. 2001. ‘Ireland: Policy, Poetics and Parody’. In The Cambridge 
Companion to Spenser, edited by Andrew Hadfield, 60–78. Cambridge 
Companions to Literature. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521641999.004. 
Mitchell, Melanie. 2019. Artificial Intelligence: A Guide for Thinking Humans. London: 
Pelican. 
Mordvintsev, Alexander, Christopher Olah, and Mike Tyka. 2015. ‘Deepdream-a Code 
Example for Visualizing Neural Networks’. Google Research 2 (5). 
Musil, Robert. 1990. Precision and Soul: Essays and Addresses. Translated by Burton 
Pike and David S. Luft. Chicago and London: Chicago University Press. 
Ng, Andrew. 2018. ‘Self-Driving Cars Are Here’. Medium. 7 May 2018. 
https://medium.com/@andrewng/self-driving-cars-are-here-aea1752b1ad0. 
Norman, Donald A. 1994. Things That Make Us Smart: Defending Human Attributes in 
the Age of the Machine. New Ed edition. Reading, Mass: Basic Books. 
———. 2013. The Design of Everyday Things. Revised and Expanded edition edition. 
Cambridge, MA London: MIT Press. 
Radford, Alec, Jeffrey Wu, Rewon Child, David Luan, Dario Amodei, and Ilya 
Sutskever. 2019. ‘Language Models Are Unsupervised Multitask Learners’. 
https://cdn.openai.com/better-language-
models/language_models_are_unsupervised_multitask_learners.pdf. 
Rosenfeld, Amir, Richard Zemel, and John K. Tsotsos. 2018. ‘The Elephant in the 
Room’. ArXiv:1808.03305 [Cs], August. http://arxiv.org/abs/1808.03305. 
Russell, Stuart. 2019. Human Compatible: AI and the Problem of Control. 01 edition. 
S.l.: Allen Lane. 
Shelley, Mary. (1818) 1998. Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus [The 1818 
Text]. Edited by Marilyn Butler. Oxford: OUP. 
Smith, Brian Cantwell. 2019. The Promise of Artificial Intelligence : Reckoning and 
Judgment. Cambridge: The MIT Press. 
Spenser, Edmund. (1590–1596) 1977. The Faerie Queene. Edited by A. C. Hamilton. 
London and New York: Longman. 
Sterne, Laurence. (1759–1767) 1983. The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, 
Gentleman. Edited by Ian Campbell Ross. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Swift, Jonathan. (1726) 2005. Gulliver’s Travels. Edited by Claude Rawson. Oxford: 
OUP. 
Szegedy, Christian, Wei Liu, Yangqing Jia, Pierre Sermanet, Scott Reed, Dragomir 
Anguelov, Dumitru Erhan, Vincent Vanhoucke, and Andrew Rabinovich. 2015. 
‘Going Deeper with Convolutions’. In 2015 IEEE Conference on Computer 
Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR), 1–9. 
https://doi.org/10.1109/CVPR.2015.7298594. 
Tegmark, Max. 2018. Life 3.0: Being Human in the Age of Artificial Intelligence. 
London: Penguin. 
The Economist. 2017. ‘Computer Says...; From Our AI Correspondent’, 23 December 
2017. 1987437669. Business Premium Collection. 
Wolfe, Jessica. 2005. Humanism, Machinery, and Renaissance Literature. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
 
1 For a more balanced assessment of AlphaGo’s intellect, see Mitchell (2019, 214–18). 
2 One key aspect of superintelligence that Shelley left implicit was the possibility of an 
‘intelligence explosion’, in which an AI learns to improve itself and unleashes exponential 
growth (Good 1966). When Frankenstein refuses to create a bride for the monster, why does 
 the monster not simply steal Frankenstein’s technology and start manufacturing new and 
improved mates for himself? He even has Frankenstein’s lab notebook! (Shelley [1818] 
1998, 105) Perhaps this possibility was simply too horrifying for Shelley to contemplate. At 
the end of the novel, Frankenstein dies, and the secret of AI dies with him. 
3 Actually this is just the ‘top-5’ accuracy, but the distinction is unimportant here. 
4 References to The Faerie Queene are by book, canto and stanza number. 
5 See https://www.mturk.com/. 
6 Generated at https://talktotransformer.com/. 
 
 
